Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as n→∞, which scoring rule maximizes, under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (uniform probability distribution over profiles), the probability that the Condorcet candidate wins the election, given that a Condorcet candidate exists? We produce an analytic solution, which is not the Borda (...) Count. Our result agrees with recent numerical results from two independent studies, and contradicts a published result of Van Newenhizen (Economic Theory 2, 69–83. (1992)). (shrink)

Men are living in the midst of a world pervaded by ideas.* Ideas, which provide men with help in their will to act and to think according to rules, which offer them guidance in their lives, are mustered into systems which are called ideologies.Ideologies are issued by the inclusive society, by special, functional groups inside the society and, beginning with a given stage in the development of human society, by ideological movements which profess to provide men (...) not only with guidance for special tasks or functions, but for life as a whole. So, individual men are faced with various sets of ideologies, more or less in agreement between themselves, more 'or less authoritative for them. They must choose between the suggestions, the rules, the orders given to them. As men are always in search of some degree of consistency in their ways of thinking and acting, they fit together the ideas they choose, unconsciously, into systems, into personal, private, individual ideologies. (shrink)

In a three-candidate election, a scoring rule s (s in [0,1]) assigns 1, s, and 0 points (respectively) to each first, second and third place in the individual preference rankings. The Condorcet efficiency of a scoring rule is defined as the conditional probability that this rule selects the winner in accordance with Condorcet criteria (three Condorcet criteria are considered in the paper). We are interested in the following question: What rule s (...) has the greatest Condorcet efficiency? After recalling the known answer to this question, we investigate the impact of social homogeneity on the optimal value of ?. One of the most salient results we obtain is that the optimality of the Borda rule (s=1/2) holds only if the voters act in an independent way. (shrink)

In a three-candidate election, a scoring rule λ, λ∈[0,1], assigns 1,λ and 0 points (respectively) to each first, second and third place in the individual preference rankings. The Condorcet efficiency of a scoring rule is defined as the conditional probability that this rule selects the winner in accordance with Condorcet criteria (three Condorcet criteria are considered in the paper). We are interested in the following question: What rule λ has the greatest (...) Condorcet efficiency? After recalling the known answer to this question, we investigate the impact of social homogeneity on the optimal value of λ. One of the most salient results we obtain is that the optimality of the Borda rule (λ=1/2) holds only if the voters act in an independent way. (shrink)

Many voting rules and, in particular, the plurality rule and Condorcet-consistent voting rules satisfy the simple-majority decisiveness property. The problem implied by such decisiveness, namely, the universal disregard of the preferences of the minority, can be ameliorated by applying unbiased scoring rules such as the classical Borda rule, but such amelioration has a price; it implies erosion in the implementation of the widely accepted majority principle . Furthermore, the problems of majority decisiveness and of the erosion (...) in the majority principle are not necessarily severe when one takes into account the likelihood of their occurrence. This paper focuses on the evaluation of the severity of the two problems, comparing simple-majoritarian voting rules that allow the decisiveness of the smallest majority larger than 1/2 and the classical Borda method of counts. Our analysis culminates in the derivation of the conditions that determine, in terms of the number of alternatives k, the number of voters n, and the relative (subjective) weight assigned to the severity of the two problems, which of these rules is superior in light of the dual majoritarian approach. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that when we assign different credences to a proposition, a perfect compromise between our opinions simply ‘splits the difference’ between our credences. I introduce and defend an alternative account, namely that a perfect compromise maximizes the average of the expected epistemic values that we each assign to alternative credences in the disputed proposition. I compare the compromise strategy I introduce with the traditional strategy of compromising by splitting the difference, and I argue that my strategy (...) is a reasonable characterization of epistemic compromise. (shrink)

De Finetti introduced the concept of coherent previsions and conditional previsions through a gambling argument and through a parallel argument based on a quadratic scoring rule. He shows that the two arguments lead to the same concept of coherence. When dealing with events only, there is a rich class of scoring rules which might be used in place of the quadratic scoring rule. We give conditions under which a general strictly proper scoring (...) rule can replace the quadratic scoring rule while preserving the equivalence of de Finetti’s two arguments. In proving our results, we present a strengthening of the usual minimax theorem. We also present generalizations of de Finetti’s fundamental theorem of prevision to deal with conditional previsions. (shrink)

In many voting systems, voters’ preferences on a set of candidates are represented by linear orderings. In this context, scoring rules are well-known procedures to aggregate the preferences of the voters. Under these rules, each candidate obtains a fixed number of points, sk\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$s_k$$\end{document}, each time he/she is ranked k\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$k$$\end{document}th by one voter and the candidates are ordered according to the total number (...) of points they receive. In order to identify the best scoring rule to use in each situation, we need to know which properties are met by each of these procedures. Although some properties have been analyzed extensively, there are other properties that have not been studied for all scoring rules. In this paper, we consider two desirable social choice properties, the Pareto-optimality and the immunity to the absolute loser paradox, and establish characterizations of the scoring rules that satisfy each of these specific axioms. Moreover, we also provide a proof of a result given by Saari and Barney, where the scoring rules meeting reversal symmetry are characterized. From the results of characterization, we establish some relationships among these properties. Finally, we give a characterization of the scoring rules satisfying the three properties. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSuppose that beliefs come in degrees. How should we then measure the accuracy of these degrees of belief? Scoring rules are usually thought to be the mathematical tool appropriate for this job. But there are many scoring rules, which lead to different ordinal accuracy rankings. Recently, Fallis and Lewis [2016] have given an argument that, if sound, rules out many popular scoring rules, including the Brier score, as genuine measures of accuracy. I respond to this argument, (...) in part by noting that the argument fails to account for verisimilitude—that certain false hypotheses might be closer to the truth than other false hypotheses are. Oddie [forthcoming], however, has argued that no member of a very wide class of scoring rules can appropriately handle verisimilitude. I explain how to respond to Oddie's argument, and I recommend a class of weighted scoring rules that, I argue, genuinely measure accuracy while escaping the arguments of Fallis and Lewis as well as Oddie. (shrink)

Scoring rules measure the deviation between a forecast, which assigns degrees of confidence to various events, and reality. Strictly proper scoring rules have the property that for any forecast, the mathematical expectation of the score of a forecast p by the lights of p is strictly better than the mathematical expectation of any other forecast q by the lights of p. Forecasts need not satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus, but Predd et al. [9] have shown (...) that given a finite sample space and any strictly proper additive and continuous scoring rule, the score for any forecast that does not satisfy the axioms of probability is strictly dominated by the score for some probabilistically consistent forecast. Recently, this result has been extended to non-additive continuous scoring rules. In this paper, a condition weaker than continuity is given that suffices for the result, and the condition is proved to be optimal. (shrink)

Epistemic scoring rules are the en vogue tool for justifications of the probability norm and further norms of rational belief formation. They are different in kind and application from statistical scoring rules from which they arose. In the first part of the paper I argue that statistical scoring rules, properly understood, are in principle better suited to justify the probability norm than their epistemic brethren. Furthermore, I give a justification of the probability norm applying statistical (...) class='Hi'>scoring rules. In the second part of the paper I give a variety of justifications of norms for rational belief formation employing statistical scoring rules. Furthermore, general properties of statistical scoring rules are investigated. Epistemic scoring rules feature as a useful technical tool for constructing statistical scoring rules. (shrink)

Can there be good reasons for judging one set of probabilistic assertions more reliable than a second? There are many candidates for measuring "goodness" of probabilistic forecasts. Here, I focus on one such aspirant: calibration. Calibration requires an alignment of announced probabilities and observed relative frequency, e.g., 50 percent of forecasts made with the announced probability of.5 occur, 70 percent of forecasts made with probability.7 occur, etc. To summarize the conclusions: (i) Surveys designed to display calibration curves, from which (...) a recalibration is to be calculated, are useless without due consideration for the interconnections between questions (forecasts) in the survey. (ii) Subject to feedback, calibration in the long run is otiose. It gives no ground for validating one coherent opinion over another as each coherent forecaster is (almost) sure of his own long-run calibration. (iii) Calibration in the short run is an inducement to hedge forecasts. A calibration score, in the short run, is improper. It gives the forecaster reason to feign violation of total evidence by enticing him to use the more predictable frequencies in a larger finite reference class than that directly relevant. (shrink)

Dutch Book Arguments. B is susceptibility to sure monetary loss (in a certain betting set-up), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the DBT and the Converse DBT. Representation Theorem Arguments. B is having preferences that violate some of Savage’s axioms (and/or being unrepresentable as an expected utility maximizer), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the RT.

When choosing a voting rule to make subsequent decisions, the members of a committee may wish this rule to be self-selected when it is the object of a choice among a menu of different possible voting rules. Such concepts have recently been explored in Social Choice theory, and a menu of voting rule is said to be stable if it contains at least one self-selective voting rule at each profile of preferences on voting rules. We consider (...) in this article the menu constituted by the three well-known scoring rules {Borda, Plurality, and Antiplurality}. Under the Impartial Culture assumption, which proposes an a priori model to estimate the likelihood of the profiles, we will derive a probability for the stability of this triplet of voting rules. (shrink)

Strictly proper scoring rules have been studied widely in statistical decision theory and recently in experimental economics because of their ability to encourage assessors to honestly provide their true subjective probabilities. In this article, we study the spherical scoring rule by analytically examining some of its properties and providing some new geometric interpretations for this rule. Moreover, we state a theorem which provides an axiomatic characterization for the spherical scoring rule. The objective of (...) this analysis is to provide a better understanding of one of the most commonly available scoring rules, which could aid decision makers in the selection of an appropriate tool for evaluating and assessing probabilistic forecasts. (shrink)

We focus on the dichotomous choice model, which goes back as far as Condorcet (1785; Essai sur l'application de l'analyse a la probabilité des décisions rendues a la pluralité des voix, Paris). A group of experts is required to select one of two alternatives, of which exactly one is regarded as correct. The alternatives may be related to a wide variety of areas. A decision rule translates the individual opinions of the members into a group decision. (...) A decision rule is optimal if it maximizes the probability of the group to make a correct choice. In this paper we assume the correctness probabilities of the experts to be independent random variables, selected from some given distribution. Moreover, the ranking of the members in the team is (at least partly) known. Thus, one can follow rules based on this ranking. The polar different rules are the expert and the majority rules. The probabilities of the two polar rules being optimal were compared in a series of papers. The main purpose of this paper is to outline the results, providing exact formulas or estimates for these probabilities. We consider a variety of distributions and show that for all of these distributions the asymptotic behaviour of the probabilities of the two polar rules follows the same patterns. (shrink)

In an ideal democracy, people from all walks of life would come together to talk meaningfully and respectfully about politics. But we do not live in an ideal democracy. In contemporary democracies, which are marked by deep social divisions, different groups for the most part avoid talking to each other. And when they do talk to each other, their speech often seems to be little more than a vehicle for rage, hatred, and deception. -/- Democratic Speech in Divided Times (...) argues that we should nevertheless not give up on the ideal of democratic public speech. Drawing on the resources of political theory, epistemology, and philosophy of language, this book develops a sustained account of the norms that should govern public discourse in deeply divided circumstances. Should we try to find common ground when we talk to our political opponents, even though they seem unreasonable? Should we refrain from expressing anger, if we want to get things done? How can we use our speech to fight hate speech and disinformation? And is it even possible to speak to 'the other side,' in settings where different groups dislike one another, live apart from one another, and don't know much about one another? By tackling these questions, Lepoutre demonstrates that, when governed by the right set of norms, public speech can be a powerful force for good even amidst profound social divisions. (shrink)

Jeremy Waldron, among others, has forcefully argued that public hate speech assaults the dignity of its targets. Without denying this claim, I contend that it fails to establish that bans, rather than counterspeech, are the appropriate response. By articulating a more refined understanding of counterspeech, I suggest that counterspeech constitutes a better way of blocking hate speech’s dignitarian harm. In turn, I address two objections: according to the first, which draws on contemporary philosophy of language, counterspeech does not block (...) enough hate speech; according to the second, counterspeech blocks too much speech. Although these objections should qualify our optimism regarding counterspeech, I demonstrate that each can be turned, with even greater force, against hate speech bans. (shrink)

This present book explores recent advances in modeling discourse processes, in particular, new approaches aimed at understanding pathological language behavior specific to schizophrenia. The contributors examine the modeling paradigm of formal semantics, which falls within the scope of both linguistics and logic while providing overlapping links with other fields such as philosophy of language and cognitive psychology. This book is based on results presented during the series of workshops on Coherence and Discourse organized by SLAM, a project developed to (...) systemize the study of pathological language processing by taking an overarching interdisciplinary approach combining psychology, linguistics, computer science and philosophy. The principle focus is on conversations produced by people with psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and autism. The contributions come from young and experienced researchers, and invited speakers. The book appeals to likeminded students and researchers. (shrink)

According to an influential objection, which Martha Nussbaum has powerfully restated, expressing anger in democratic public discourse is counterproductive from the standpoint of justice. To resist this challenge, this article articulates a crucial yet underappreciated sense in which angry discourse is epistemically productive. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, which emphasize the distinctive phenomenology of emotion, I argue that conveying anger to one’s listeners is epistemically valuable in two respects: first, it can direct listeners’ (...) attention to elusive morally relevant features of the situation; second, it enables them to register injustices that their existing evaluative categories are not yet suited to capturing. Thus, when employed skillfully, angry speech promotes a greater understanding of existing injustices. This epistemic role is indispensable in highly divided societies, where the injustices endured by some groups are often invisible to, or misunderstood by, other... (shrink)

The Condorcet efficiency of a social choice procedure is usually defined as the probability that this procedure coincides with the majority winner (or majority ordering) in random samples, given a majority winner exists (or given the majority ordering is transitive). Consequently, it is in effect a conditional probability that two sample statistics coincide, given certain side conditions. We raise a different issue of Condorcet efficiencies: What is the probability that a social choice procedure applied to a sample matches (...) with the majority preferences of the population from which the sample was drawn? We investigate the canonical case where the sample statistic is itself also majority rule and the samples are drawn from real world distributions gathered from national election surveys in Germany, France, and the United States. We relate the results to the existing literature on majority cycles and social homogeneity. We find that these samples rarely display majority cycles, whereas the probability that a sample misrepresents the majority preferences of the underlying population varies dramatically and always exceeds the probability that the sample displays cyclic majority preferences. Social homogeneity plays a fundamental role in the type of Condorcet efficiency investigated here. (shrink)

Ignorant speech, which spreads falsehoods about people and policies, is pervasive in public discourse. A popular response to this problem recommends countering ignorant speech with more speech, rather than legal regulations. However, Mary Kate McGowan has influentially argued that this ‘counterspeech’ response is flawed, as it overlooks the asymmetric pliability of conversational norms: the phenomenon whereby some conversational norms are easier to enact than subsequently to reverse. After demonstrating that this conversational ‘stickiness’ is an even broader concern for counterspeech (...) than McGowan suggests—it applies not just to oppressive or hateful speech, but also to ordinary policy-related misinformation—I argue that a more sophisticated account of counterspeech can nevertheless overcome it. First, the stickiness objection overlooks the distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ counterspeech. Instead of directly negating a distorted proposition, positive counterspeech affirms a correct proposition that is inconsistent with the falsehoods at hand. This, I contend, allows it to counter ignorant speech without triggering the properties that render it sticky. Second, the stickiness objection presupposes an unrefined conception of counterspeech’s temporality. Counterspeech should be understood as a diachronic process, which not only follows, but also pre-empts, ignorant utterances. Drawing on speech-act theories of silencing, I argue that pre-emptive counterspeech can condition the conversational context so as to prevent subsequent ignorant utterances from enacting sticky conversational norms. Thus, this theoretically-refined conception of counterspeech helps appreciate how verbal responses might overcome the stickiness of conversational norms; and, in doing so, it reveals that this stickiness need not provide reasons to prefer legal remedies to counterspeech. (shrink)

Jeremy Waldron, among others, has forcefully argued that public hate speech assaults the dignity of its targets. Without denying this claim, I contend that it fails to establish that bans, rather than counterspeech, are the appropriate response. By articulating a more refined understanding of counterspeech, I suggest that counterspeech constitutes a better way of blocking hate speech’s dignitarian harm. In turn, I address two objections: according to the first, which draws on contemporary philosophy of language, counterspeech does not block (...) enough hate speech; according to the second, counterspeech blocks too much speech. Although these objections should qualify our optimism regarding counterspeech, I demonstrate that each can be turned, with even greater force, against hate speech bans. (shrink)

While much research has focused on the effects of ethical and unethical leadership, little is known about how followers come to perceive their leaders as ethical or unethical. In this article, we investigate the co-creation of ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. Specifically, we draw from emerging research on moral congruence in organizational behaviour and empirically investigate the role of congruence in leaders’ and followers’ moral foundations in followers’ perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. By analysing objective congruence scores from 67 (...) leader–follower dyads by means of polynomial regression with surface response analysis, we find partial support for our theoretically derived predictions. Significant effects were revealed for the fairness, loyalty, and authority moral foundations but not for the care and sanctity moral foundations. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of these findings. (shrink)

Contemporary public discourse is saturated with speech that vilifies and incites hatred or violence against vulnerable groups. The term “hate speech” has emerged in legal circles and in ordinary language to refer to these communicative acts. But legal theorists and philosophers disagree over how to define this term. This paper makes the case for, and subsequently develops, the first corpus-based analysis of the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” We begin by demonstrating that key interpretive and moral disputes surrounding hate speech (...) laws—in particular, surrounding their compatibility with the rule of law, democracy, and free speech—depend crucially on the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” Next, we argue, drawing on recent developments in legal philosophy, that corpus linguistics constitutes a distinctively promising tool for ascertaining the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” Finally, we offer a proof of concept, by outlining, and analyzing the interpretive and moral implications of, the first such study. (shrink)

In his collection of essays Having the World in View (2009), John McDowell draws a distinction between empirical experience (conceived as the conceptual activity relevant to judgment) and empirical judgment (i.e., the full-fledged assertoric content itself ). McDowell’s latest proposal is that the form of empirical experience is transferable into judgment, but it is not itself a judgment. Taking back the view he advanced in Mind and World, McDowell now believes that perception does not have propositional content as such, but (...) the content of perception can, however, always be actualized in a judgment. There is, in other words, a strict parallelism between the deliverances of sensibility and potential future judgments of experience. The early Husserl disagrees with this and recognizesexplicitly the existence of coherent forms of perceptual engagement with the world that is independent of the mastery of language and the use of concepts.Perception constitutes—together with certain other embodied practices—our primary mode of access to the world, and this occurs before and independently ofour thinking activity. However, the realization of the centrality of time for intentionality will lead Husserl after 1905 to recognize a kind of lawfulness internal tothe sensuous materials themselves, prior to any egoical achievement. The most immediate consequence of this paradigm change is that the very idea of non-conceptual content now seems unwarranted. Indeed, if time is that which keeps the process of sense formation unified even at the lowest levels of constitution, then the world-disclosing activity of the ego cannot be discontinuous with the conceptual realm. Against this background, it will be argued that the dialectic between the conceptual and non-conceptual ultimately makes no sense on a phenomenological basis. Once temporality has entered the scene, the only meaningful opposition that stands is that between the conceptual and pre-conceptual spheres. (shrink)

The paper is organized around two ideas that come out in Steve Crowell’s Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger and that I discuss critically in turn. The first concerns the reach of Crowell’s claim according to which the connection between intentionality, meaning and normativity is necessary in all forms of intentional experience. I make my point by considering the case of imagining experiences, which are—I argue—meaningful, intentional, but not necessarily normative in any relevant sense. The second question (...) is about Crowell’s criticism of the role of bodily self-awareness in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception. While Crowell is right to maintain that the norm of proper functioning relevant to bodily skills can’t be understood as arising from a system of kinaesthetic sensations alone, I argue that bodily self-awareness still has a normative role to play in perception inasmuch as it allows me to cast my own experience in evaluative terms. (shrink)

We prove the following theorem: For a partially ordered set Q such that every countable subset of Q has a strict upper bound, there is a forcing notion satisfying the countable chain condition such that, in the forcing extension, there is a basis of the null ideal of the real line which is order-isomorphic to Q with respect to set-inclusion. This is a variation of Hechler’s classical result in the theory of forcing. The corresponding theorem for the meager ideal (...) was established by Bartoszyński and Kada. (shrink)

Today, eighteenth-century poetry is undervalued by readers and scholars alike, still the victim of a persistent bias among French literary historians who consider this period as rationalist and antipoetic, an era of unfortunate verse that was fortunately ushered out by Romanticism. By reading a corpus of anthologies of seventeenth-century French poetry published in the twentieth century, this article investigates a particular modality of this invalidation: how the aesthetic merits of the Baroque are elaborated against highly critical readings of eighteenth-century poetry. (...) “Baroquist” anthologists deliberately (mis)read Enlightenment-era poetry as insipid in order to value and define “their” object of study more forcefully. Should we believe these critics, the Baroque and the Enlightenment periods would seem to be wholly antithetical to each other: the former rife with orphic creative flare, celebrated as the cradle of modern poetry, and the latter suffering from a total lack of poetic artistry. The aim of this article is to show the ways in which Baroquist anthologies see eighteenth-century poetry as “post-classic” at best, and to offer a rationale for their damaging historiographical strategy. (shrink)

Today, eighteenth-century poetry is undervalued by readers and scholars alike, still the victim of a persistent bias among French literary historians who consider this period as rationalist and antipoetic, an era of unfortunate verse that was fortunately ushered out by Romanticism. By reading a corpus of anthologies of seventeenth-century French poetry published in the twentieth century, this article investigates a particular modality of this invalidation: how the aesthetic merits of the Baroque are elaborated against highly critical readings of eighteenth-century poetry. (...) “Baroquist” anthologists deliberately (mis)read Enlightenment-era poetry as insipid in order to value and define “their” object of study more forcefully. Should we believe these critics, the Baroque and the Enlightenment periods would seem to be wholly antithetical to each other: the former rife with orphic creative flare, celebrated as the cradle of modern poetry, and the latter suffering from a total lack of poetic artistry. The aim of this article is to show the ways in which Baroquist anthologies see eighteenth-century poetry as “post-classic” at best, and to offer a rationale for their damaging historiographical strategy. (shrink)

Bhagavadacharya was the central figure in the Renaissance of Ramanandi tradition in the 20th century. He dedicated his life to gaining independence for his school from Ramanuja Sampradaya, whose leaders regarded Ramanandis as “third-class” members of the movement mostly because of the lack of shastric scholarship and inter-caste commensalities among the latter. To achieve this goal, Bhagavadacharya wrote commentaries on most of the Prasthāna-traya as well as many other works popularizing the Ramanandi version of Vishishtadvaita. He widely used his knowledge (...) of philosophy in shastric debates with his opponents among whom were not only followers of Ramanuja but also a famous Advaitin guru and political activist Swami Karpatri whom he allegedly defeated in a dispute which concerned the rights of Harijans initiated into Vaishnava tradition to enter temples and share communalities with the so-called “pure Hindus”. In my paper, I will present key philosophical and practical ideas of Bhagavadacharya based on my research conducted in the library of Bhagavadacharya Smarak Bhavan in August 2021. It will include basic details related to the acharya’s background and activities as well as analysis of his teachings within the frames of his main scope of Vishishtadvaita’s propagation among Hindus in general and Ramanandis in particular. (shrink)

Intensity profiles of emotional experience over time have been found to differ primarily in explosiveness and accumulation. However, the determinants of these temporal features remain poorly understood. In two studies, we examined whether emotion regulation strategies are predictive of the degree of explosiveness and accumulation of negative emotional episodes. Participants were asked to draw profiles reflecting changes in the intensity of emotions elicited either by negative social feedback in the lab or by negative events in daily life. In addition, trait, (...) and state usage of a set of emotion regulation strategies was assessed. Multilevel analyses revealed that trait rumination was positively associated with emotion accumulation. State rumination was also positively associated with emotion accumulation and, to a lesser extent, with emotion explosiveness. These results provide support for emotion regulation theories, which hypothesise that rumination is a central mechanism underlying the maintenance of negative emotions. (shrink)

In philosophical debates about immigration, one of the most prominent arguments asserts that a state’s citizenry has a right to unilaterally control its territorial borders by virtue of its right to self-determination. This is the self-determination argument. The present article demonstrates that this argument is internally undermined by the Coercion Principle, according to which all persons subjected to coercive political power are entitled to an equal say in exercising that power. First, whichever way the self-determination argument identifies the relevant (...) self-determining self, it is bound to rely on the Coercion Principle. Specifying the self politically involves appealing to the Coercion Principle, as it is a core principle of democratic theory. Alternatively, specifying a pre-political self fails to circumvent this problem, as a similar issue arises further down the argumentative line, when inferring the right to unilaterally control borders from the right to self-determination. Finally, since border controls coerce would-be immigrants, this reliance on the Coercion Principle renders the self-determination argument self-defeating. (shrink)

This study analyses the patenting activities of university science and engineering professors in Canada between 1920 and 1975. Unlike most studies on commercial activities in academia, which typically focus on the post-1980 period and on university practices, we focus on the pre-1980 period and on the individual decisions of professors to patent their inventions. Based on quantitative patent data, we show that patenting, and thus professors’ interest in the possible commercial value of their scientific discoveries made in university laboratories, (...) was relatively common on an individual and informal basis well before the 1980s and the advent of what is now called “academic capitalism”. This contradicts the belief that before that period, universities were a kind of ivory towers in which professors isolated themselves from external influences and engaged only in pure and disinterested research. (shrink)

The paper is organized around two ideas that come out in Steve Crowell’s Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger and that I discuss critically in turn. The first concerns the reach of Crowell’s claim according to which the connection between intentionality, meaning and normativity is necessary in all forms of intentional experience. I make my point by considering the case of imagining experiences, which are—I argue—meaningful, intentional, but not necessarily normative in any relevant sense. The second question (...) is about Crowell’s criticism of the role of bodily self-awareness in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception. While Crowell is right to maintain that the norm of proper functioning relevant to bodily skills can’t be understood as arising from a system of kinaesthetic sensations alone, I argue that bodily self-awareness still has a normative role to play in perception inasmuch as it allows me to cast my own experience in evaluative terms. (shrink)

Summary The author is of the opinion that as a result of Alexander the Great’s conquest of Syria, which had been a single administrative entity under the Achaemenids, it was divided into two satrapies – the northern and the southern one. He believes that Menon, son of Cerdimmas, was appointed as the first head of the northern satrapy, to be replaced by Arimmas, who, in his turn, was succeeded by Asclepiodorus, son of Eunicus. Besides, it seems that Andromachus became (...) the first head of the southern satrapy, and after he was killed, Menon, transferred from the north to the south, took his place. Already in Alexander’s lifetime, probably in 329/328, Syria was once again merged into one satrapy. It is unclear who was installed as satrap of the unified region. At any rate, it could not have been Menes, son of Dionysius: the hypothesis that in winter 331/330 he was made satrap of the new province including Syria and Cilicia does not stand scrutiny. In the author’s view, the main task Alexander assigned to Menes was to take control and then to keep open and organized the sea communications with the coast of Syria, Phoenicia and Cilicia, and in the matters concerning these activities Menes was fully independent of the local satraps. (shrink)

Maxime Vachon | : L’objectif de cet article est de montrer l’unité du chapitre 14 du Peri Hermeneias, chapitre dans lequel Aristote retourne au fondement de l’échange dialectique, à savoir la doxa. Je montre ainsi que ce chapitre expose progressivement les trois conditions sémantiques que des points de vue doivent respecter pour être contraires : le sujet doit être le même, l’objet doit aussi être le même, mais le mode de prédication doit être contradictoire. | : The aim of this (...) paper is to show the unity of chapter 14 of the Peri Hermeneias, in which chapter Aristotle goes back to the basis of dialectical exchange, that is doxa. Thus I show that this chapter presents in successive order the three semantical conditions that points of view must respect in order to be contrary : the subject has to be the same, the object has also to be the same, but the mode of predication must be contradictory. (shrink)

The claim that language is in principle inaccessible to consciousness may look counterintuitive but is not as challenging as finding an answer to the subsequent question of why that must be the case -- if language is a function that is in the service of consciousness and we cannot imagine why language would have existed at all without the existence of consciousness. On the one hand, language is the cognitive capacity that seems best fit to support consciousness in its monitoring (...) and control functions; on the other hand, language learning (learning the rules of one's own language), language structure and language processing turn out upon closer scrutiny to be in principle inaccessible to consciousness. I present a set of arguments in favour of the thesis that language is in principle inaccessible to consciousness on the basis of a set of asymmetries between sentence structure and the structure of consciousness. If the thesis in question is on the right track, we have to face two basic problems. The first deals with linguistics method(s), namely how can we study a very complex mental phenomenon like language if it is not available to introspection? The second problem is related to the question put in the title of this article. The suggested answer is along the lines that inaccessibility of language to consciousness enables a cognitive architecture that can run a Cartesian theatre. (shrink)

The structure of Russian science of the XIX century was dominated by state forms of its organization. At the same time, there were also a few private (non-governmental) forms of research communities. One of the little-studied phenomena of scientific privacy is the so-called “kruzhok” (a little circle in Russian). The article examines the history of the formation and activity of one of such “kruzhoks”, formed in the 1880s–1890s around Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, who was seriously engaged in research in the (...) field of lepidopterology (the branch of entomology studying butterflies, Lepidoptera). The role and significance of this “kruzhok” for the development of descriptive entomology in the situation of its weak institutionalization in Russia at the end of the XIX century are briefly considered, the course of scientific research of the Grand Duke and his entourage and the reasons for the termination of their activity are discussed. The history of this informal association is interpreted by us as a manifestation of the purposeful life-making of the Grand Duke, who thus tried to professionalize his hobby and enter the scientific community of entomologists on an equal footing, without breaking with his social environment and without going beyond the behavioral norms established by society for persons of his status. It is shown that the Nikolai Mikhailovich’s “kruzhok” became not only an instrument of his life-making, but also an influential center of Russian lepidopterology, the development of which was thereby given a powerful impetus. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of manopavicāra, found within the exposition of dependent arising in chapter three of the Commentary on the Treasury of Abhidharma of Vasubandhu. According to Vasubandhu, the feeling link in the chain of dependent arising consists of body-related feeling and mind-related feeling. Mind-related feeling is divided into eighteen manopavicāras. Manopavicāras are the three modalities of feeling: satisfaction, dissatisfaction, equanimity. They are said to rely on the objects or to direct the mind toward the objects, which, (...) in the case of the meditations of the formless realm, are not the objects of the senses but the objects of mind. The article will explore the definitions, characteristics, and functions of mental evaluations, their distribution in the three realms of existence, and its rationale. (shrink)

Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, (...) we investigated intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility in patients suffering from behavioural frontotemporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction. Thus, the ‘performance error model’ should predict that bvFTD patients will give less compatibilist answers. However, we found that bvFTD patients give answers quite similar to subjects in control group and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the ‘performance error model’ should be abandoned in favour of other available model that best fit our data. (shrink)

The development of reasoning systems exploiting expert knowledge from interactions with humans is a non-trivial problem, particularly when considering how the information can be coded in the knowledge representation. For example, in human development, the acquisition of knowledge at one level requires the consolidation of knowledge from lower levels. How is the accumulated experience structured to allow the individual to apply knowledge to new situations, allowing reasoning and adaptation? We investigate how this can be done automatically by an iCub that (...) interacts with humans to acquire knowledge via demonstration. Once consolidated, this knowledge is used in further acquisitions of experience concerning preconditions and consequences of actions. Finally, this knowledge is translated into rules that allow reasoning and planning for novel problem solving, including a Tower of Hanoi scenario. We thus demonstrate proof of concept for an interaction system that uses knowledge acquired from human interactions to reason about new situations. (shrink)

The essay contrasts two recurring phenomena of European culture: renaissance and avant-garde. The author discusses the paradigmatic Renaissance of 15th and 16th centuries and the paradigmatic Avant-Garde of early 20th century from the point of view of a practicing artist, interested in philosophical, social, religious, and political involvements of artists and their creation. The author shows the artistic and social history of 20th century as a struggle between the Avant-Garde and the Renaissance ideals, which, as he points out, found (...) a fertile ground in in the 20 years that followed immediately the Second World War. (shrink)

The essay contrasts two recurring phenomena of European culture: renaissance and avant-garde. The author discusses the paradigmatic Renaissance of 15th and 16th centuries and the paradigmatic Avant-Garde of early 20th century from the point of view of a practicing artist, interested in philosophical, social, religious, and political involvements of artists and their creation. The author shows the artistic and social history of 20th century as a struggle between the Avant-Garde and the Renaissance ideals, which, as he points out, found (...) a fertile ground in in the 20 years that followed immediately the Second World War. (shrink)

We propose in this paper DIAL, a framework for inter-agents dialogue, which formalize a collective decision-making process to compose divergent interests and perspectives. This framework bounds a dialectics system in which argumentative agents play and arbitrate to reach an agreement. For this purpose, we propose an argumentation-based reasoning to manage the conflicts between arguments having different strengths for different agents. Moreover, we propose a model of argumentative agents which justify the hypothesis to which they commit and (...) take into account the commitments of their interlocutors according to their reputations. In the scope of our dialectics system, a third agent is responsible of the final decision outcome which is taken by resolving the conflict between two players according to their competences and the advanced arguments. (shrink)

Reading Of An Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy poses difficult questions of interpretation. We have indeed to account for multiple and often entangled themes as we have to deal with Derrida’s apparent inconsistency between his criticism of the apocalyptic tone in philosophy and his own use of that particular tone in his discourse. This article sheds light on this apparent ambiguity by drawing a parallel between the question of tone in hegelian philosophy and the “apocalyptic” thread of the “end (...) of philosophy” emphasized upon in Of An Apocalyptic Tone… Such a comparison provides us with a fresh understanding of that central thread of the book and helps in return unraveling the derridean debate with Kant and his heirs which relates to the possibility and the limits of demystification. (shrink)

The recent publication of Geschlecht III allows us, for the first time, to synoptically embrace the Geschlecht project and to appreciate its overarching consistency. I choose to read the Geschlecht series as the scene of an inheritance whereby Derrida wrestles with Heidegger’s legacy. More specifically, I identify the linchpin of Derrida’s critique of gathering (Versammlung), which organizes his reading throughout the series. I then distinguish between two layers within this reading : the first, wherein he stages the refusal of (...) an inheritance deemed metaphysical or suspicious, and the less well-known second, which sets the stage for a shared heritage (gift, promise, economy). The value of gathering thus consecutively appears on one and the other side of these dividing lines, until the legacy’s pluralization turns out to be what’s at stake in the scene. (shrink)

Le conseil d’administration du CNRS a adopté le 23 juin 2011 la charte interne de l’expertise, qui adapte aux spécificités de ses propres activités le texte de la Charte nationale de l’expertise. La charte interne du CNRS est guidée par la volonté de répondre efficacement à deux enjeux majeurs de l’expertise scientifique : la crédibilité des experts et la qualité du processus et du produit de l’expertise.The CNRS governing board adopted its internal Charter on Expert Studies on 23 June 2011, (...) which adapts the National Charter on Expert Studies to the specific features of CNRS activities. The internal CNRS Charter rests on the principle of efficient striving to address two major issues concerning scientific expert studies : the credibility of experts and the quality of expert study processes and output. (shrink)

Dans le domaine biomédical, qui est l’objet principal de cet article, la littérature montre une corrélation directe entre le financement d’une recherche par un industriel et la communication de résultats qui lui sont favorables. Cet effet, appelé « le biais de financement », persiste depuis les travaux des années 1990 jusqu’aux travaux récents. Il peut être élargi à d’autres domaines tels que l’agro-alimentaire, l’étude des risques environnementaux et sanitaires, etc. Les conflits d’intérêts peuvent influencer la recherche par des voies inconscientes (...) ou volontaires. Nous analysons les modes d’action possibles des conflits d’intérêts sur le déroulement de l’activité scientifique, ainsi que l’efficacité des diverses solutions qui ont été proposées pour gérer ces influences.In the field of biomedicine, which is the main object addressed in this article, the literature shows a direct correlation between industrial funding for research and the communication of results that are favourable to the industry. This effect, known as the “ funding effect”, has been persistenly found since the 1990s. It can also affect other fields such as agri-foods or environmental and health risk assessments. Conflicts of interest can influence research subconsciously or deliberately. In this article, we analyse the various ways in which conflicts of interest can influence the way scientific activities proceed, as well as the effectiveness of the different solutions put forward to manage the influence exerted. (shrink)